CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 156

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

(OPD(67) 19th Meeting, Item 3)

FRIDAY, 12th MAY 1967 at 10.30 a.m.

Copy No..

43

FAR EAST DEFENCE POLICY

(Previous Reference: OPD(67) 17th Meeting)

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Defence Secretary (OPD(67) 29) on our Far East defence policy.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that on his recent visit to Singapore and

Malaysia he had discussed with their Governments and with the

Commander-in-Chief, Far East and the Service Commanders the Government's

proposals in respect of their Far East defence policy. He had explained that by 1st April 1968 we aimed to secure a reduction of 20,000 in the

number working in or for the Services in these countries compared with the

total at the end of confrontation, that by 1970-71 we hoped to reduce the

number of servicemen and civilians employed by the Services in the Far East by about a half and that we were assuming for planning purposes that British forces would be off the mainland of Asia by mid-1970s. He had

made it clear that no specific date for final withdrawal had been fixed

and no decision taken on whether we would retain a military capability

in the Far East thereafter. He had also explained that we would be

prepared to make economic aid available on a significant scale to mitigate

the effect of our reductions in Singapore and Malaysia and had declared

our intention to announce final decisions on our future defence policy

before the Parliamentary Summer Recess.

The Prime Minister of Singapore had been chiefly concerned about

the maintenance of internal and external confidence in Singapore, both in the short and the long term. He had not resisted the prospect of a reduction of our forces by half by 1970-71 (though there would be major problems with the trade unions), provided that the phasing was carried

out in consultation with the Singapore Government, but had stressed that

a statement now of our total withdrawal by the mid-1970s would do damage to confidence on the future of Singapore which would be far more

serious than the direct economic effects. He had, therefore, urged that we should announce no more than our intentions in respect of 1970-71,

while working quietly and closely together towards the final British

objective and he hoped that after the mid-1970s we should continue to

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